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SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS 
The Space Shuttle has been fl ying for over 20 years 
and based on the Orbiter des ign li fe of 100 missions 
it should be capable of fl ying at least 20 years more-
if we take care of it. The Space Shuttle Development 
Office established in 1997 has identi fied those 
upgrades needed to keep the Shuttle fl ying safely and 
efficiently until a new reusable launch vehicle (RL Y) 
is available to meet the agency commitments and 
goals for human access to space. The upgrade 
requirements shown in figure 1 are to meet the 
program goals, support HEDS and next generation 
space transportation goals while protecting the 
country ' s investment in the Space Shuttle. A major 
review of the shuttle hard ware and processes was 
conducted in 1999 which identified key shuttle safety 
improvement priorities, as well as other system 
upgrades needed to re li ably continue to support the 
shuttle miss ions well into the second decade of thi s 
century. The hi gh priority safety upgrades selected 
fo r development and study will be addressed in thi s 
paper. 
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F igure l. Why Space Shuttle Upgrades? 
A major shuttle program acti vity has been in 
developing a probabili stic ri sk analysis (PRA) tool 
that can quanti fy shuttle risk and be used to identify 
potential upgrades based on reducing that ri sk. 
Shuttle probabilistic ri sk models quanti fy the 
potential fo r loss of vehicle and crew due to 
catastrophic system fa ilures. Those models are 
deve loped at the component, system, and hard ware 
element level and thi s provides NASA with a method 
for ranking hard ware ri sks. More importantly thi s 
methodology provides a way to assess the potential 
ri sk reduction impact of a suite of proposed safety 
upgrades. As an example Figure 2 illustrates the 
signi ficant reduction in the loss of vehicle (LOY) risk 
during ascent which has been achieved by 
modifications to the Space Shuttle Main Engine 
(SSME), and which could be improved wi th 
proposed future upgrades . The result of an analysis of 
the ri sk reduction effects of several proposed safety 
upgrades is illustrated in Figure 3. The current 
estimate of ascent catastrophic ri sk is approximately 
1 in 483 miss ions, which could be reduced to almost 
1 in 1000 miss ions if we were to successfully 
implement a ll the high priority safety upgrade 
candidates identi fied. 
The identi fied candidate safety upgrades were 
prioritized based on thei.r fli ght safety benefit. 
Potential reduction in LOY ri sk probabilities was the 
primary bas is for selecting the safety upgrades, with 
the exception of the cockpit avionics upgrade (CAU). 
The CAU was selected as the highest priority safety 
upgrade based on the potential for maki ng major 
improvements in situational awareness for the fli ght 
crew during highly critical mul ti-failure fli ght 
scenarios. 
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Figure 2. SSME Upgrades Reduce Ascent Risk 
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Figure 3. Safety Benefits of Proposed Upgrades 
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CAU is described on figure 4 . This upgrade takes 
advantage of the new glass cockpit already 
implemented in two of the fo ur orbiters, and which is 
scheduled for the other two during planned 
modi fication periods over the next couple years. The 
CAU will add the capability to di splay additional 
info rmation on the new glass cockpit fl at panel 
di splay screens. The improved cockpi t di splay sui te 
and computational platform will have on-board 
shuttl e abort fli ght management software fo r real-
time abort advisories and enhanced caution and 
warning system for improved on-board fa ilure 
di agnostics. 
F igure 4 . Cockpit Avionics Upgrades 
The electronic auxiliary power uni t (EAPU), shown 
in figure 5, is another high priori ty upgrade which 
would signi ficantl y reduce the mission ri sk. This 
upgrade replaces the hydrazine dri ven gas turbine 
that supports the orbi ters hydraulic system with a 
battery dri ven electric motor. The safety benefits for 
thi s upgrade are two fo ld , first it gets rid of the toxic, 
fla mmable, corrosive hydrazine and second it 
replaces a 35000-RPM gas turbine with an electri c 
motor. The electri c motor that dri ves the hydraulic 
pump will provide an output to the hydrauli c system 
that will be transparent to today's system to avoid 
recertification of the contro l system. In addition to 
the fli ght safety benefits significant ground safety 
benefits will be achieved fro m eliminating hydrazi ne 
handling and process ing. 
A major reduction in SSME risk is planned by the 
introduction of a highl y sophisticated use of digital 
technology to carry-out onboard real time assessment 
of fa ilure modes which are not currently detectable 
by onboard computers. There are two phases of 
SSME advanced hea lth management system upgrades 
figure 6. The first phase is in development and adds 
the necessary modi fications to the SSME controller 
to fac ilitate the addi tion of a new vibration redline. 
AIAA 2001-3412 
Figure 5. Electric Auxiliary Power Uni t (EAPU) 
The use of thi s new redline is projected to eliminate 
enough of the castrophic fai lures to reduce the ri sk 
fo r engine loss by 23 percent. The second phase still 
in fo rmulation will provide a health management 
computer. This computer will provide expanded 
vibration monitoring capability, operate the linear 
engine model and store pertinent engine fli ght data 
for post fli ght assessment. This added information 
can be used to shut down, throttle or make a 
perfo rmance correction to avo id a castrophic loss of 
the engine. This would reduce the risk for engine 
loss by addi tional 2 1 percent. 
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Figure 6. Advanced Health Management System 
Similar to the orbi ter 's EAPU upgrade strategy there 
is a planned upgrade for the SRB Thrust Vector 
Control (TVC) APU to eliminate use of hydrazine. 
However, the SRB upgrade will use a helium driven 
APU instead of the batteries planned for the orbiter. 
This upgrade shown on figure 7, utilizes most of the 
existing TVC system but adds helium tanks (3), an 
isolation valve and regulator and modifies the turbine 
and the controller required fo r replacing hydrazine 
with helium. The safety benefits mostly associated 
with getting rid of the hydrazine reduces the over all 
risk of the SRB by 21 percent. 
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Figure 7. SRBTVC Helium Powered APU 
A change to the shuttle' s external tank (ET) welding 
process adds a friction stir welding (FSW) capability 
for manufacturing the longitudinal LOX and LH2 
barrels. Applying the FSW technology adds weld 
JOint strength, margins, fracture toughness and 
process control. It will improve the weld process 
band with parameters toward the goal of a 6 sigma 
control process. It 's primary safety attribute will be a 
significant reduction in weld errors while decreasing 
ET production time and cost. A comparison of the 
new FSW process to the existing fusion soft plastic 
arc welding is shown on figure 8. FSW provides a 
major reduction in weld set up and will vastly reduce 
and simplify the process parameters. 
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Friction Stir Welding Vastly Reduces and Simplifies Process Variables 
Figure 8. Friction Stir Weld Process Comparison 
The main landing gear tire is being redesigned to 
increase the tire load capacity, thereby adding safety 
margin for landing. This upgrade shown on figure 9 
will modify and add tire plies. The new tire designs 
are cULTently in testing and proceeding toward a 
decision for implementation in the fall. 
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Figure 9. Improved Main Landing Gear Tire 
The goals for performing these upgrades are to 
achieve a major reduction in mission risks and reduce 
the probabilities for loss of vehicle for ascent, on-
orbit and entry. That includes improve the crew 
cockpit situational awareness to manage critical 
operational situations. The challenge is to implement 
these upgrades into the shuttle fleet in the 2005 to 
2007 time frame without impacting the on-going 
manifest support. 
The only upgrades that are currently approved for 
system development are the SSME ARMS phase 1 
vibration redline and the ET friction stir welding. 
The CAU, EAPU, SSME ARMS Phase II , SRB 
TVC/ APU and MLG Tire/Wheel upgrades are 
progress ing in definition phase toward authority to 
proceed (ATP) reviews. In addition to these 
upgrades several studies are in work on abort 
improvements, thermal protection systems and 
ground SCAPE suits. 
